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          These considerations urge the search for a continuing policy 
which will prevent a renewal of German aggression and, at the 
same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of 
time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.
 
     A. Security Controls
 
           The Department of State believes that it would be premature 
at present to attempt to specify the nature of the long-term 
security controls to be established over Germany beyond the 
general principles of complete disarmament and control of war 
potential.
 
     In determining the exact manner in which Germany's ability
to make war is to be destroyed, the Department of State believes 
that the various proposals should be judged by their prospective 
effectiveness and the possibility of their continued enforce-
ability. There are several ways  in which Germany could be 
effectively made militarily impotent. The most obvious method 
would be the prohibition of a military machine through forbidding 
military training and the possession or acquisition of arms. 
Manifestly a Germany without soldiers and without weapons would 
be no menace to the peace of the world. Various kinds of inter-
vention in German industry and commerce would likewise add further 
effective restraints.
 
          With such latitude in the choice of measures afforded by 
the test of effectiveness, the crucial test is that of enforce-
ability over a period of years or even decades.
 
          There is involved in this second criterion the problem of
devising controls which would be relatively inexpensive, and
simple in operation, particularly with respect to detecting                                         .
German attempts at evasion. There is involved alas the more
dangerous problem of choosing a series of measures which the
victory  powers will be willing to maintain after war passions have
cooled. Experience during the period between the two great wars
suggests that the crucial issue is not so much the exact nature
of the controls as the determination of the Allies to maintain 
them. Experience likewise indicates that once the process of 
giving up controls has begun, it is difficult to halt the dis-
integrating process short of war.
 
     Since it believes that the more complex and the more numerous 
the controls the greater the danger of their being abandoned, the 
Department of State recommends that the controls over Germany 
should be as simple and as few in number as would be compatible 
with safety.
 
     B. Political Reconstruction of Germany
 
     1. The Ultimate Objective. - Germany's repudiation of 
militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideologies will in the
                         long-run