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long-run depend on the psychological disarmament of the German 
people, tolerable economic conditions, and the development of 
stable political conditions.
 
      The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction 
and orderly development lies in the establishment of democratic 
government despite the fact that serious difficulties will beset 
such an attempt. The Department of State therefore recommends 
that it be made the aim of United States policy to prepare the 
German people for self-government as soon as self-government is 
possible in terms of internal conditions and security considera-
tions.
 
      The successful establishment of a democratic regime will 
depend in considerable measure not only on a tolerable standard 
of living but also on a moderation of the ultra-nationalistic 
mentality now dominant. A democratic experiment will labor under 
a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of 
the victors and it must, if it is to survive, be able to offer 
some claim to the loyalty and to the patriotism of the German 
people. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in 
political life, the Department of State recommends that there be 
offered to the Germans the assurance that a democratic Germany 
which demonstrates its intention and ability to live at peace can 
earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to 
avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was
exploited by the nationalists to discredit democracy and inter-
national cooperation, the Department of State opposes writing into 
the peace settlement a war-guilt clause directed against the 
German people as a whole.
 
      2. Partition. The Department of State recommends that this 
Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany.
 
     An imposed dismemberment of Germany would not obviate the 
necessity for enforcing the same security controls that should be 
set up if Germany is left intact. Because of the high degree 
of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it 
must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be 
imposed but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by 
imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and 
never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between 
the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determi-
nation to reunite which would, in all probability, be the response 
of the German people. The economic aspects of partition, finally, 
would create a serious dilemma. A political dismemberment which 
left the German economy substantially unified would have little 
significance as a security measure; the disruption of German 
economy, on the other hand, would carry with it an unnecessary 
decline of the European, as well as the German, standard of living.
 
                                                     3. Decentralization