January 16, 1945. Reparation and Restitution Policy toward Germany 1. Nature of American Interest It is dangerous to assume, because the reparation claims of this country are likely to be very small, that we have little interest in the subject of reparation. Not only can an ill-conceived reparation policy give rise to mischievous consequences in itself but, what is even more important, it may jeopardize the achievement of the political and economic objectives of this country vis-a-vis Germany. For these reasons the raparation settlement with Germany is an issue of major importance to the United States. Accordingly, the guiding principle of U. S. policy in regard to reparation should be that the reparation claims of our Allies should be supported only if, and to the extent that, such claims do not conflict with the other elements of the settlement with Germany. Reparation policies must conform and be subordinate to the security and economic measures adopted with respect to Germany; these measures should not be modified or weakened to enable Germany to pay more reparation. Conceived thus as a "residual", the reparation pro- gram will be determined, in its main outlines, by prior decisions with regard to industrial controls, export restrictions, territorial adjustments, etc. which may be imposed on Germany. For example, if chief reliance for economic security is placed on selective prohibitions and controls, Germany may be able (barring extreme war damage) to deliver a large volume of reparation goods out of current production. If, on the other hand, large sections of German industry are to be permanently dis- mantled, the bulk of reparation payments would necessarily take the form of transfers of existing German capital equipment, rather than of current output, and the total volume of reparation deliveries is likely to be com- paratively small. Similarly, restriction of exports for commercial reasons, or important transfers of terri- tory, would likewise affect the amount and form of reparation. The |