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faced when such a Conference was held.
 
               The experience of the Disarmament Conference 
 
forces the realisation of how great are the diffiulties 
 
in attempting to find bases upon which a reduction or limita-
 
tion of national Armies, Navies and Air Forces can be 
 
brought about.
 
     Even if a temporary basis for adjustment could be 
 
found how far could we rely upon nations observing their 
 
undertakings and in the event of their not doing so, how
 
would it be contemplated they should be forced to honour 
 
their obligations.. The idea of sanctions, either economic 
 
or military, must be discarded in the light of the
 
experience with regard to the provisions of the Covenant 
 
of the League of Nations.
 
     In considering this question internal politics 
 
cannot be ignored. Is it not inevitable that in
 
individnal countries political parties would spring up 
 
maintaining that the rights of the country had been 
 
sacrificed by the Government and demanding a reconsider-
 
ation of the Disarmament Agreement.
 
     An even greater danger is that unless present in-
 
dications are wholly misleading, we shall encounter, 
 
after the war, in the more advanced countries, as in 
 
1922-1950, a strong pacifist movement. Democratic 
 
Governments will probably be affected and will reduce
 
armaments below the safety level. In less advanced 
 
countries pacifist pressure will be resisted and once  
 
again we shall find the advanced Democracies in a posi-
 
tion of relative weakness.
 
                                             These