This area is only about 1620 miles from the eastern
tip of South America and is nearer the Western Hemisphere than any
other part of Africa or Europe. It would therefore be advantageous to
the Axis powers as a base for operations against
this Hemisphere. It is the most likely point from which those Powers
might launch a movement to South America by air.  The denial of this
area to the Axis Powers would be advantageous from the viewpoint of
hemisphere defense.
 
Neither the denial of this area to the Axis Powers nor
its possession for our own use is an essential requirement for
hemisphere defense. Depending upon our own strength, particularly at
sea, compared to that of a victorious Axis, an effort to hold a base in
this area might well constitute an overextension on our part.
 
Owing to the great distance to any important objective,
the paucity of communications and the desert terrain, a base in West
Africa would have little or no value for offensive operations on the
continent of Africa.
 
The principal disadvantage to the occupation of a
West African base is the effort required to secure, defend and maintain
such a base and the involvements which may ensue.
 
It has been mentioned that the employment of the
necessary forces for this operation will require the suspension of
other operations in the area of the British Isles. Those operations,
particularly the establishment of an air force in England to strike at
the heart of Germany, will contribute far more towards winning the
present war than our occupation of a base in West Africa. The
establishment of an effective air striking force in England would be
delayed until the spring of 1942 by diverting the necessary air forces
to this operation.
 
As indicated above, about 100 transports, including
cargo carriers, and lO hospital ships would be required. The diversion
of this number of ships would jeopardize the flow of essential supplies
and munitions to England and interfere seriously with other important
sea Communications. Furthermore, it would be necessary to complete
essential alterations in available commercial vessels to get them for
this duty. Since the operation visualizes landings at open beaches or
where harbor facilities are lacking, the ships must have the facilities
for handling and landing their cargoes. Recent experience in converting
ships for transport duty indicates that essential alteration would
require months.
 
    It would be necessary therefore at this time to
withdraw the ships to be used and begin conversions. This in
turn will interfere seriously with construnction and repair work
in the available ship yards.
 
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