All replacements and supplies must come from the
United States whose nearest ports are 3800 miles distant. Should the
Axis Powers emerge victorious in the present war and have at their
disposal strong naval forces they could operate against the flank of
our line of communications and seriously threaten their security.
 
If such a base be established it is safe to assume
that Axis Powers will do their utmost to capture or deny its use to us
and our associates.  We would be forced to a choice between a static
defense or active operations in the field. History proves, corroborated
by current war operations, that a static defense without heavy
reinforcement rarely is successful. Furthermore, a static defense would
in all probability permit the enemy to employ his air forces to deny
the use of the base by our naval forces. To undertake active
operations in North Africa would involve such large forces, such
involved losistic measures as to be entirely out of proportion to the
value of the base to be defended.
 
              Should England be defeated in the present war the
 
Axis Powers will be able to employ very strong forces against
Dakar operating on interior lines from relatively nearby
bases. While it is true that the Sahara and 2400 miles intervene
between the North African coast and Dakar, there are
roads through the Sahara, a net-work of airways towards Dakar,
and the Germans have proved adept in supply over long distances.
 
 
               In the event of our entry into the present war as an
 associate of England, the Axis Powers will still be able to
 dispose of considerable strength against a West African base.
 To expose ourselves to the necessity of dispatching, supplying
 and maintaining a sufficient force in North Africa, would
 most certainly leave us but two choices: to sacrifice the
 defending force or to undertake operations which would involve
 an indefinite postponement of the eventual decisive offensive
 against Germany in Europe.
 
               5.      CONCLUSIONS.
 
		 a.    The establislmnent of a base area on the West
 Coast of Africa requires the seizure of Dakar.
 
                       b.    The seizure and establishment of a base at
Dakar would require Army forces in the order of l00,000; l00 transports
and l0 hospital ships, and corresponding naval vessels for escort and
convoy.
 
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