estimated German time-tables. This Committee considers "Z" day to be meaningless, inasmuch as
the Germans rotate their divisions in line throughout the year and constantly strive to maintain
fresh divisions available for service anywhere. Moreover, it is our opinion that numerous
divisions as well as the bulk of the German air force in Russia have already been withdrawn to rest
and refit.
(2) A more practical starting point would be a "D" day, that on which the Germans
will resume a major offensive against Russia. This "D" day will be determined primarily by
climatic conditions. From the Sea of Azov to Finland there is naturally a wide variation in
weather conditions. Along the Black Sea coast the thaw should begin about the middle of March,
whereas north of Moscow winter conditions will continue well into May. The thaw, usually
combined with heavy rains, makes quadmires of the roads, which at best are none too good. On
the front from Taganrog to Kursk, it is extremely doubtful that climatic conditions would permit
the launching of a major offensive prior to 15 May. For that reason 15 May is taken as a probable
"D" day.
b. Operations against the Caucasus. (1) The campaign which requires most thorough
consideration is that envisaged by the British Committee in paragraphs 13 (A) ii and 14 (a); that
is, a drive on the Caucasus, while containing Russian forces in the center and north.
(2) A campaign in Russia is primarily a problem in logistics. The railroad-highway net
will determine in large measure the number of troops that can be employed. From the line
Kharkov-Taganrog three railways lead eastward to the line Kamensk-Rostov. From that line only
one railway leads on to Stalingrad. In order to secure adequate rail facilities for a force advancing
on the Caucasus, it becomes practically necessary to obtain use of the Kurak-Voronozh-Povorino-Stalingrad rail line. Thus there would be four railroads east from the line Kursk-Taganrog to the lateral Voronezh-Rostov railroad and two thence to Stalingrad.
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