(3)  Although the Germans supplement railways with heavy motor columns, it is
inconceivable that even they can supply more than 20 divisions to each penetrating rail line.
Accordingly, a maximum of 80 divisions could be maintained on the initial Kursk-Taganrog front,
which is 400 miles long. For general global planning purposes, it is reasonable to assume one
division for every 5 or 6 miles of front in a normal campaign, or 70 to 80 divisions on a 400-mile
front. This agrees with the estimated maximum capacity of the railroad net. Thus the German
main effort may be estimated as a mass of about 80 divisions advancing from the line
Kursk-Taganrog.
     (4)  For purposes of general estimation, it may be assumed that the normal average
advance in an operation of this nature would be limited to 100 miles a month, in alternate equal
stages of movement and consolidation .    (In the Russian offensive of 1941 the Germans covered
approximately 500 miles in five months.)
          (5).      The offensive from Kursk-Taganrog against the Caucasus would probably take the
form of a right wheel pivoting on Rostov, so that eventually this group of armies would change
from an easterly direction to a southeasterly one along line of Don River between Rostov and
Stalingrad. Within two weeks Rostov would probably have fallen. The drive to Stalingrad,
however, might well take three or four months.  While the elements of the German Army that
reached Rostov in two weeks could well debouch therefrom, say within "D" plus 30 days, without
awaiting the fall of Stalingrad, they would be definitely limited in strength to no more than 30
divisions.  The front Stalingrad-Rostov calls for a force of nearer 40 divisions. These can be
supported when Stalingrad is taken, as the rail line Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk indicates.  The
remaining 35 divisions of the original attacking force would be utilized in containing or assistting
in containing the Russian Army in the north.
 
                              -5-