seizing the Suez Canal, driving eastward and threatening Basra.  This large-scale double
envelopment is of the type normally envisaged by the Germans.  The drive through Egypt, with
the present weakened strength of the Allied forces, would probably require not more than 20
division.
     (2)  If this gigantic maneuver was succeeding, the attitude of Turkey would no longer
be in doubt.  Rather than accept certain defeat, it is probable that the Turks would grudgingly
permit the use of their railroad and highways by Germany.
     e.   Summary.  These time-tables purely theoretical.  They are meant to indicate the
maximum rate of progress of which the Germans are apt to be capable.  So much speculative data
is involved, and so many imponderables, that rigid estimates as to forces and elapsed time
required to reach various distant objectives may be misleading and dangerous.  If the Germans can
maintain such a schedule, they can gain a major decision against Russia in 1942 and perhaps a
decision in the Middle East as well.  They would then be in a position to move on India in 1943, if
they so elect.  The Russian Army might disrupt the schedule.  The outcome therefore depends
more upon the relative combat value of Russian and German divisions than upon any other factor.
 
                              LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE,
                              Major, Cavalry,
                              Secretary, J.I.C.