5.        RELIEF OF THE BRITISH GARRISON IN NORTHERN
IRELAND. -
 
                  ADMIRAL KING said that it had been decided that for
the present U. S. forces destined for the relief of the British
garrison in Northern Ireland should be transported in the S. S. GEORGE
WASHINGTON~ which would shortly be it for service this vessel being
used on a continuous shuttle service to and from Northern Ireland. In a
few weeks time when the general trend in the Atlantic theatre could be
judged a decision could be
    taken as to whether the transport of these troops should be
accelerated or not.
 
                    THE CONFERENCE took note of this statement.
          6.        DRAFT HIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN THE
ABDA AREA. -
 
                  The Conference gave further consideration to this
directire (U S. ABC-4/5, British W. (J.P.C.)5). One minor verbal
alteration was agreed to and it was also decided to bring the statement
of the general strategic
    policy into lille with that telegraphed out to Commanders-in-Chief
in the Far East by defining the Malay Barrier. (See Annex 2.)
 
                  ADMIRAL KING said that he bad reason to believe that
the directire would meet with the approval of the President, and this
also applied to the statement on the higher direction of war in the
ABDA Area contained in U S. ABC-4/5 British WW-3 (Final). (See Annex
3.) He had also received a request that the U.S. and British Chiefs of
Staff should draft for consideration the public announcement setting up
the unified command in the ABDA Area. He thought this should be
completed on Friday.
 
            THE U.S. AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF gave final approval to
the draft directive to the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area as
amended
in the discussion (U S. ABC-4/.5, British WW-3 (Final), (See Annex 3),
and took note of Admiral King's statement.
 
7.    PROPOSED TASKS .FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE. -
 
The Conference considered the statement of tasks proposed for
the Joint Planning Committee in U.S. Serial ABC-4/4 British W (J.P.C.)
4,
    (See Annex 4.) At the suggestion of Admiral Stark it was decided
that the following note should be added to the end of the paper.
 
                  "Consideration of the Southwest Pacific theatre
including the matter of unity of command therein was treated as a first
priority and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the
foregoing document."
 
                The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff accepted the
statement (Annex 4 U.S. ABC-4/4 British WW (J.P C.)4) of the proposed
tasks