of forces .in that area .is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.
 
                 After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become
available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct all
all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly, although our operations in the near future must be
primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future
offensive.
 
         3.        The general strategic policy should therefore be:-
 
         a.    To hold the Malay Barrier, deffined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North
Australia, as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in
as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier  in order to oppose the Japanese southward
advance.
 
       b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting  positions for the Far East Area, and
Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defense of  India.
 
             c. To reestablish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.
 
            d. To maintain .communications to Burma and Australia and to and within the Far East
Area.
 
             e To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping
requirements.
 
.FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS
 
         4.    The estimated strength of forces .initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered
or planned to be sent are shown in the attached tables (Annexes I, II, and III) . Future
reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard
to the essential requirements of other theatres.
 
RECOMMENDATI ONS
 
       5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all
available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area
is soIved:-
 
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