Army
 
General. George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces
                                                     and Chief of Staff
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces and Deputy
                                                     Chief of Staff
Brig. General Raymond Lee, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Brig. General D. D. 
                                                     Eisenhower, General Staff Corps
 
Joint Secretaries
 
Brigadier L. C. Hollis, R.M.
Colonel E-. I. C. Jacob
Captain J. L. McCrea, Aide to Chief of Naval Operations Lt. Colonel P.M. Robinett, G-2, GHQ
Lt. Colonel W. T. Sexton, Assistant Secretary, W.D.G.S.
 
         1.       SUPER GYMNAST. -
 
                ADMIRAL POUND said that the British Chiefs of Staff had made a careful
examination of the various factors which affected the timing of this operation, and the earliest date
on which the first convoy could arrive at Casablanca. He explained these to the Conference and
undertook to let the United States Chiefs of Staff have a note on the subject. So far as the British
were concerned, it appeared that if January 7 were taken as the date on which planning really
began, the earliest date for D-1 on which the decision to load the first convoy could be given
would be February 4. In this event the first convoy would arrive at Algiers and Casablanca on
D-28, that is, March 3, depending upon the availability of shipping on that date. He also
pointedout that the whole undertaking would, depend upon the planning, the shipping, and the
availability of troops and materiel. As to details at points of debarkation, ADMIRAL POUND
said that he anticipated no difficulty in Algiers, and that in the British opinion, 29,000 men and
3,500 vehicles could be unloaded at Casablanca in the fortnight.
 
               GENERAL MARSHALL asked Admiral Pound if the British could undertake both
Casablanca and Algiers.
 
ADMIRAL POUND replied in the affirmative.
 
                GENERAL MAR SHALL then expressed some concern about the availability of
shipping for the second convoy and undertook to confirm that January 7 could be accepted, from
the American point of view, as the date on which planning began.
 
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