(5) It is reasonable to expect that this threat to 
the Japanese mainland will meet a concerned fighter defense 
capable of subjecting our bombardment aircraft to sucessive 
waves of attack over a eonalerable time and distance. After 
making due allowances for powerful armament of the B-29 
and wlth a full knowledge of the impracticability of furnish-
ing fighter escort, I am convinced that the cost of such an 
operation against Japan from bases in the Chengtu area will he
prohibitive.
 
 
      b. Staging fields have been recommeneded  in Eastern China for 
the Matterhorn Project to give added flexibility and security of operat-
ions. Use of these staging fields will overcome the grave risks outlined 
in a. above, and will permit of greater efficiency in operations due to 
greater and more effecttve nomb loads possible. The importance of these 
eastern staging fields has not been sufficiently emphasized up to the 
present time , with the result that delays can be expected in completion 
of necessary extensions to existing airfields to make them fully operational 
for B-29 type aircraft, unless prompt demands are made upon the Chinese Govern-
ment and unless ways and means of financing such projects are solved.
 
      e. It is not possible to over emphasize the importance of heavy 
bombardment attacks against Japan proper, but, at the same time, we must 
realize that it is not feasible at this time to schedule more than three
(3) much missions monthly and that the efforts of the Fourteenth Air Force 
during this interim must conitnue without ceasing againstagainst Japenese 
shipping and to secure and maintain air supremacy. Both of these highly 
important objectives are particularly vulnerable from China bases and both 
will assist our own forces end our allies in the Southwest Pacific and 
in the South East Asia Commend in the accomplishment of their final ob-
jectives. In addition to the two missions enumerated above, the Four-
teenth Air Force must protect the eastern terminals of the Alr Ferry
Route, its air bases in China, and furnish air support to the Chinese ground 
forces. All of these missions and responslbilites demand that there should 
be the closest coordination between our tactical and strategical air forces 
and our supply agencles. There can be only one solution for the success 
of the many tasks at hand and that is a unified air command to consist of 
all Air Forces and supporting services operating in China.
 
          2. In conclusion it is desired to emphasize that none of the many 
problems listed above is insurmountable, in fact, they can be easily solved. 
The tasks can be made cumbersome and complicated with the resulting delays 
and dissapointments and expense or they can be simplified with increased 
efficiency and success. The Commander of the Air Forces in China must 
be given complete command and control of all such Air Force and support- 
ing services as are based in or are operating from China.  
 
 
                                   C.L. Chennault
                                   Major General, U.S.A.
                                   Commanding