S E C R E T
 
              ENCLOSURE "A"
 
     The war aims of the United States and British coincide in
respect to the basic objectives of: (a) the imposition upon
the Axis nations of a defeat that will render them militarily
impotent; and (b) in principle, the defeat of Germany as of 
first priority.
     It is the general nature of the latter objective, which
is not susceptible of precise definition, that has given rise
to some divergence of views. It is a divergence easily under-
stood. It springs from such fundamental causes as the differ-
ences in the geographical situation of the two nations vis-a-vis
the several enemies, and in the marked contrast between the two
nations in respect of their territorial structures and the
bases of their power.
     The threat in the Pacific, the importance of the Mediter-
ranean, do not appeal to them with the same force. To the U. S.
the former appears of such a nature and imminence that they
view with greater concern than the British an indefinite delay
in meeting its challenge. Operations in the Mediterranean, on
the other hand, are viewed by the U.S. solely from the military 
viewpoint of wherein they contribute to winning the war. By 
the British, restored control of the Mediterranean is regarded
as an objective of national policy essential to the maintenance
of their present Imperial power, whereas they are confident
that the defeat of Japan, no matter how long delayed, nor how 
completely accomplished by the United States, will restore the
British position in the Far East.
     In consequence, United States policy indicates adoption
of those direct measures that promise the earliest possible de-
feat of Germany. The British have hitherto regarded successful
accomplishment of such measures as being militarily impracti-
cable at present. Furthermore, the decline in their Imperial
strength that would result from a heavy loss of British manpower
renders them reluctant to undertake major costly operations of
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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