MOBILITY AND UTILIZATION 0F AMPHIBIOUS
                         ASSAULT CRAFT
 
Report by Joint war Plans Committee
 
1. An analysis has been made to determine a scheme of optimum
 
use of amphibious assault craft for operations in 1943-44. This
 
analysis is contained in Enclosure "A".
 
2. The conclusions derived from the Enclosure are as follows:
 
a. U. S. landing craft remaining after HUSKY can be shifted to:
 
.            (1) ROUNDUP to meet target date.
             
             (2) ANAKIM to meet target date.
 
 
b. U. S. landing craft remaining after any other limited
 
operation in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY
 
 can be shifted to:
 
(1) ROUNDUP to meet target date  provided they are released:
 
(a) From eastern MEDITERRANEAN - early December 1943
 
(b) From western MEDITERRANEAN - mid-December 1943
 
c. Losses incurred in operations in the MEDITERRANEAN
 
subsequent to HUSKY can only be made good by diversions from
 
the PACIFIC (See J.C.S. 291/1).
.
d. Amphibious assault craft from. the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
 
can be ready at PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALLS campaign:
 
         (1) By 1 April 1944, if the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS campaign
 
is completed about 1 January 1944.
 
       (2) BY 1 July 1944, if the BISMARCK campaign is completed
 
about 1 April 1944.
 
e. Diversion from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to ANAKIM 
 
must be effected by mid-August; however, this will jeopardize
 
the operations in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
 
f. The most logical source of craft for ANAKIM is from U.S. Production.
 
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