be borne in mind that, although there are many combinations that
 
 can be used to lift a combat team and its supporting elements, there
 
 is always one best method, and possibly a few other acceptable methods.
 
 The decision must be based on the tactical scheme of maneuver and
 
 detailed information on hydrographical conditions.
 
    4. Some of the factors that determine the number of landing craft 
 
remaining after an operation and available for use elsewhere are:
 
a. The loss rate.   Little data exists upon which to base
 
an estimate of any value. Operations against several types
 
of defense such as strong or weak enemy air opposition (even
 
types, of enemy aircraft have an influence), coast defenses,  beach
 
 defenses, mines, underwater obstacles, and anti-boat guns must be
 
 conducted before estimates can be based upon valuable data. In this
 
 connection there is not even agreemerit on the loss rate for operational
 
 training as evidenced by planning for HUSKY wherein the plarmers estimated
 
 20%,  the Navy Department recommended about 5% the U. S. Army used
 
10%; as a compromise.
 
              Reports received 12 May 1943 indicate following training
 
loss rates:
 
                             LST            LCI (L)         LCT           LCM(3)           LCVP
 
Camp Edwards,     Nil              Nil               16%             20%                 33% (1)
Mass. (U. S.
Army Base)      
Amphibforlant             For all types - 30% (2)
 
 
(1) Reduced to 20% with experienced personnel.
 
(2) Norfolk has less experienced personnel than Camp Edwards.
 
 b. Use for logistic support. Immediately after an amphibious attack, 
 
landIng craft are required to land supplies across the beach.
 
 The length of time landing craft of
 
 
 
                                                -4-