'In this state of the history of legislation
and practice,
and in consideration of the nature of the office of
commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, the
committee is of opinion that the acts of Congress which
have authorized the constitution of general courts-martial
by an officer commanding an army, department, etc., are,
instead of being restrictive of the power of the
commander-in-chief, separate acts of legislation, and
merely provide for the constitution of general
courts-martial by officers subordinate to the
commander-in-chief, and who, without such legislation,
would not possess that power, and that they do not in any
manner control or restrain the commander-in-chief of the
army from exercising the power which the committee think,
in the absence of legislation expressly prohibitive,
resides in him from the very nature of his office, and
which, as has been stated, has always been exercised.'
Without dwelling longer on this question, we
approve the conclusion reached by the Court of Claims, that
it is
within the power of the President of the United States, as
commander-in-chief, to validly convene a general
court-martial even where the commander of the accused
officer to be tried is not the accuser." (Underscoring
ours).
As recently as 1945 the United States District Court
for the
Northern District of Illinois in analyzing the powers of
the President as Commander-in-Chief concluded that power
resides in the President "as a function of his military
office" to do things necessary to preserve the government
in time of war emergency. United States v. Montgomery Ward
& Co. 58 Fed. Supp. 408, Certiorari denied 65 S. Ct. 862,
324 U.S. 858; reversed on other grounds 150 Fed. 2d 369. In
that case the District Judge said:
"As Commander in Chief the President directs the
activities of the armed forces. He has extensive authority
over
persons and property in the field of military operations. It
is his responsibility to see
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