are limited to matters civil in nature. Under the
Constitution Congress has the power to provide that the
Secretary of Defense shall be a civilian as it has in the
case of the present statute (5 U. S. C. A. Section 171a),
but it has no power to disturb the status of the President
as Commander-in-Chief.
 
     This conclusion violates no fundamental principle of
our
system of government. The President's military powers are
always subordinate to the civil authority. While the
President is charged at all times with the supreme command
of the army and navy, he does not have the power to declare
war since that function is vested exclusively in the
Congress. However, once war has been declared it is the
function of the constitutional Commander-in-Chief as head
of the Army and Navy to do everything necessary to
prosecute that war to a successful conclusion. The
President, therefore, as Commander-in-Chief in a military
capacity is still subordinate to the Congress in a civil
capacity. 
 
        The foregoing conclusion in no way clashes with the
theory of separation of powers which is so thoroughly
imbedded in our system of government. The basic separation
of powers is not between civil and military but between the
Legislative (Constitution, Article I) Executive (Article
II) and the Judicial (Article III). Within that pattern of
separation of powers there is no conflict in placing at the
head of the executive branch of the government an
individual who is at the same time performing his duties in
both a civil and in a military capacity.
 
         In the final analysis all of the reasons advanced
against the
 
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