NAVY DEPARTMENT
               OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
                         WASHINGTON
 
                    February 27, 1941
 
          MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN
 
     At at recent conference attended by the heads of all Admiralthy Divisions, First Sea Lord,
CINC Coastal Comand, CINC Western Approaches, Adm. Subs, Vice Chief Naval Staff, Asst.
Chief Naval Staff, Representatives CINC Plymouth, Operations Officer Home Fleet, and First
Lord of Admiralty, the critical shipping situation was discussed and emphasized.  The First Sea
Lord (Admiral Pound) stated that the shippng losses for February were exceedingly serious, and
he inferred that another month of such losses might be critical.  This latter was concurred in by the
Director of Tade Division. When questioned by Admiral Pound, the Director of Trade Division
stated that the problem of air attacks was of more immediate seriousness than that of submarines.
     The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Alexander) inquired of Air Marshall Bowhill (Head
of Coastal Command) as to whether of not the Coastal Command could assure him that planes
would be made available to counter the attacks on shipping by nazi long range bombers.  Air
Marshal Bowhill stated in reply that there were no suitable planes available, and that even though
large numbers of long range bombers from the Bomber Command were utilized as fighters, they
could not successfully cope with the German long range bombers.  The First Lord of the
Admiralty then stated that he would have to tell the prime minister that the Coastal Command
could not protect ships against the Condor bombers, and he inferred that a solution must be found
at once.  He futher stated that he could not take the responsibility for losses that were beyond the
control of the Navy.
     When these Nazi long range bombers are attacking ships in the Atlantic, they make a very
low approach parallel to the course of the ship being bombed, and practically lay the bombs on the
deck, thus insuring a high percentage of hits.  the British that a great number of short range anti-aircraft guns could defeat this attack, but the guns are not available.  It was stated by the vice
chief of Naval staff that the British could ten thousand Oerlinkon guns.  Every merchant ship
should be provided with at least four of this type of gun in order to