COPY
 
                                   COPY NO. 1
 
                                   From: Troopers
                                   To:     Britman
                                   No. 69606 M.1.3   of 9th February
 
     Personal for Field Marshal Dill from C.I.C.S.
 
     Following is summary of military conversatios held in Russia in December 1941 and
reposrt of MASON MACFARLANE on visit to Russian Front in January 1942.  Full text follows
by bag.
 
1.    M. Stalin was informed that on conclusion of operations in LIBYA it had been hoped to send
10 sqadrons of Hurricanes to the Russian Front but owing to changed situation in the Far East
that was now impossible.  Supply of tanks and aircraft however would continue.  He fully
understood we could not help in the way we had proposed.
 
2.   STALIN enquired as to likelihood of opening second front in Europe.  We relied that we
should not be able to in immediate future but that one of the subjects of the Libyan campaign was
to secure a base from which we would attack ITALY.
 
3.   Policy of Russians had been to fight continuous rearguard action thereby tiring the German
troops.  They were now able to make a counteroffensive which they proposed to continue
throughout the winter.  However they expected the Germans to attack again in the spring as the
Germans still had a great superiority in tanks, whereas the Russiand had only a slight superiority
in the air.
 
4.   When asked how he owuld view the situation if Russia became engaged on the Eastern Front
STALIN replied that he would regard it without enthusiasm but by the spring troops that had
been withdrawn from that theatre would be replaced by new formations so that it would then be
as strong as it was previously.  He believed the Japanese would attack the Soviet Union before the
spring but if this did not repeat not happen he was prepared to resume conversatios as to the
advisability of Russia declaring war on Japan.
 
5.   Russians suggested an operation to seize PETSANO, the Russians providing the land forces
while we provided naval and some air forces. (This pland has subsequently been dropped at
Russian instigation.)
 
6.   Transportation facilities on the PERSIAN GULF supply route were discussed.  The Russians
asked for capacity of 60,000 tons per month rising to 90,000 or 120,000 tons by April.  Maximum
we could offer was 90,000 by April.  With regard to taking material by road to TABRIZ it was
pointed out that we were trying to obtain vehicles for this but they would have to come from the
U.S.A.