CONCLUSIONS.
 
10.            After the Japanese have occupied Burma, the
two chief dangers in the INDIAN OCEAN, in our view, will be 
as follows :-
 
        (a)          Sea-borne expedition to occupy CEYLON.
             This would have a dual object first to deny to us
             the main British fleet base, and second to enable
             the Japanese directly to threaten sea communications
             with the MIDDLE EAST and with RUSSIA via the
             PERSIAN GULF.
 
        (b)          Occupation of the CALCUTTA Area by means of
              combined sea-borne and overland attacks.    This
              operation would have as an important object the
              complete cutting off of CHINA from outside
              assistance except by air transport methods.
 
11.           Defence against either of the above attacks will
be primarily by sea and air forces, naval forces playing 
a predominant part round CEYLON, and air forces in the 
CALCUTTA Area.
 
12.            The crux of the situation is the rate at which
we can provide air reinforcements for INDIA and CEYLON.
The British air strength in the MIDDLE EAST has already been 
seriously depleted by transference of air squadrons to 
INDIA, BURMA, and the FAR EAST.
 
 
 
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
10th March, 1942.