COMMENTS OF THE USE OF U.S. TROOPS IN
                  THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
 
1. General Estimate
       a. USE OF U.S. TROOPS IN SYRIA
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         A U. S. Force in the Syrian Theatre would be a strategically 
defensive force, capable merely of preventing the axis from accomplishing
some of their strategic aims. It would be incapable of accomplishing
decisive results against Germany proper.
 
b. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN LIBYA
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         A. U. S, Force in Libya would be incapable of accomplishing
decisive results against Germany proper, it would be basically a
strategically defensive force, having  however, the
opportunity for limited offensive operations with the object of
           
         (1) Elminating Axis forces from North Africa
         (2) Securing of bases in North Africa from which long range 
             bombing of targets in Europe would be possible.
         (3) Preventing Axis domination of the Mediaterrean
 
c. USE OF U.S. TROOPS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA
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A. U.S. Force in Northwest Africa would be incapable of decisive results 
of an offensive nature. It would be a strategically defensive force, which
once established, would
     
     (1) Prevent Axis seizure of West Africa
     (2) Render impossible Axis naval operations based on the West
 African coast.
     (3) Serve as a base for offensive operations having the limited
 objective of seizing French
           North Africa.
 
d. Shipping for movement of troops to any of the above named 
places will not be available prior to about September 1, 1942.
 
2. Discussion.
 
A. . USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN SYRIA
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          Ground forces employed in Syria and the surrounding
 country should be of a highly mobile type, strong in armored elements.
The area does not lend itself to the employment of large
field armies on account of shortage in communication and
transport facilities, it is doubtful if a force of greater than
ten divisions can be supported in this area.
 
     Six Infantry, two Motorized, and three Armored Divisions
will be equipped and trained by August 15, 1942. Of these the
1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions will be ready by March 31, 1942, the
4th Motorized Division by June 1, 1942, and the 1st Armored
Division by March 31, 1942.