Text Version


 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT-
 
          Subject: Gymnast Operation.
 
       General.
       From only one base, the United Kingdom, can the power of the combined British and United
States air effort be exerted in such a way as to strike directly at Germany. Plans are now being
implemented, as rapidly as sea transportation and the availability of trained air units permit, to
build up a strong air striking force in the United Kingdom. Operations by ground forces, with
adequate equipment, can only be successfully carried out against the west coast of Europe in
areas within range of aircraft based in the U.K. with adequate aircraft, and in other areas if
sufficient carrierborne aviation is available. In areas beyond the range of land based aircraft,
strong carrier-borne aviation is essential for the support of landing operations until a strong land
based air force has been established. This applies particularly to Northwest Africa because, even
though the French may be willing to cooperate fully, there always exists the definite threat that
Axis aircraft now based in the Mediterranean area would move rapidly into Spanish and North
African bases, from which they could operate against Casablanca, in such strength that
carrier-borne aviation is unlikely to be able to be sufficiently effective during the time required to
establish adequate land-based aviation.
 
       The urgency of engaging U.S. Army forces in combat to support the Russian effort in 1942 is
evident. If we can spare from other theaters the necessary means to execute Gymnast, particularly
such as combat loading vessels, carriers, aircraft, and antiaircraft, other more advantageous
operations would be feasible - for example, one against the Brest Peninsula, which we have
wished to include in "emergency" Bolero but have been unable to mount due to lack of landing
craft, air coverage, etc.
 
       The initiation of Gymnast would mean the creation of another theatre with all the "overhead"
involved. It will almost surely develop the need to reduce the 1942 Bolero effort,-either initially in
order to mount Gymnast adequately or later, when likely difficulties will render necessary a choice
between supporting either Gymnast or Bolero, as means will not be available to do both. To carry
out Gymnast in 1942, involves consequences of far-reaching importance.
The problem of adequate naval escorts, and effective naval air support during the landing and until
Army Air Forces are firmly established on land bases, is a critical factor. The U.S.-U.K. line of sea
communications must be kept open regardless of the direction of allied strategic effort. This task,
absorbing about the entire strength of the Allied Navies available in the Atlantic for this type of
duty, is
 
 
 
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