break into Austria. Conferences and discussions were held frequently
between January 1 and March 7. On the 6th of March all opposition
ceased; the Fuhrer was in close relations with Mussolini; and the
Foreign Office was ready to approve drastic action and criticism of
France and Russia. I sent a telegram on February 29 giving positive
avowal of Secretary von Neurath's oppositon to doing or proposing what
was proclaimed on March 7, but on that date he shouted approval. What
was the cause of this?
 
 
The French had promised their support to Mussolini in January 1935 in
case he annexed Ethopia. This was a violation of the League's solemn
agreement. When England became aware of Mussolini's purpose to control
the Nile and annex Egypt itself, she called upon France and the League.
France defeated England and gave Hitler the best opportunity he had
had, since he came to power, to take the lead in European affairs.
Before December 15 Mussolini was in grave danger of being overthrown,
and influential groups in Italy were working toward that end, even the
Pope was lending aid and the King of Italy hopeful of a restoration of
the throne he had lost. Frenchmen here and in Paris seemed to have no
real understanding of their own blunders. I had a long talk with the
French Ambassador on December 12. He could not foresee consequences.
 
 
As to the Franco-Soviet pact, nobody here considered it serious before
January 1. Von Neurath said to me February 29 it was only a defense
agreement and that the Russians had no idea of making war beyond their
western boundaries. Even Dr. Schacht, most influential man here after
Hitler, said there was no danger in that direction.  But
Hitler-Goebbels were ready March 1 to use Franco-Soviet pact for
propaganda; they were approving Mussolini's right to annex Ethiopia and
putting forward Germany's right to having her colonies restored; and
making ready secretly to send troops into the Rhine zone. It was the
best chance imaginable. Hitler even quoted Woodrow Wilson more than
once. How could