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Fourth: Naturally there would be no question of obtaining
from Italy positive action. It would be a question, purely and
simply, of Italy becoming aware of the fact that the integral
and complete withdrawal of her help from the Spanish rebels,
determined and sincerely carried out in fulfilment of her international
undertakings, would be the policy best conforming to an effective
defence of her political and economic interests in the Western
Mediterranean. And this because on the one hand the prospects
of her attempt at domination in Spain are daily more gloomy,
and on the other because the victory of the Republic would not
mean for her the dangers which she may have feared. If this total
and complete withdrawal, sincerely carried out, proved not to
be an obstacle for the victory of the rebels, she would have
lost nothing. If it should occasion the triumph of the Republic,
then there would be the undertakings offered by the responsible
men of that Republic, the fulfilment of which could be guaranteed,
for example, by the British Government, after arrangements to
be negotiated with the Government of the Republic.
Fifth: A solution of this nature could only be found on condition
that the Government of the Republic is maintained with its present
composition. It is only through the greatest possible authority
conferred on the Government by the fact that it represents all
the elements and parties mating up the Republic, that the pledges
and guarantees offered by it would have a worth and a solidity
which would permit them to be accepted for the fiture. The presence
of Dr. Negrin at the head of the Government would be an indispensable
condition; his undisputed authority in all section of opinion
constitutes the best guarantee of obtaining a speedy pacification
of Spain, for everyone would be ready to accept from him directions
which would not perhaps be accepted from another. When we speak
of the Republic, we mean the Republic of to-day; with its significance
an %d its men, who are