- 4 - Fourth: Naturally there would be no question of obtaining from Italy positive action. It would be a question, purely and simply, of Italy becoming aware of the fact that the integral and complete withdrawal of her help from the Spanish rebels, determined and sincerely carried out in fulfilment of her international undertakings, would be the policy best conforming to an effective defence of her political and economic interests in the Western Mediterranean. And this because on the one hand the prospects of her attempt at domination in Spain are daily more gloomy, and on the other because the victory of the Republic would not mean for her the dangers which she may have feared. If this total and complete withdrawal, sincerely carried out, proved not to be an obstacle for the victory of the rebels, she would have lost nothing. If it should occasion the triumph of the Republic, then there would be the undertakings offered by the responsible men of that Republic, the fulfilment of which could be guaranteed, for example, by the British Government, after arrangements to be negotiated with the Government of the Republic. Fifth: A solution of this nature could only be found on condition that the Government of the Republic is maintained with its present composition. It is only through the greatest possible authority conferred on the Government by the fact that it represents all the elements and parties mating up the Republic, that the pledges and guarantees offered by it would have a worth and a solidity which would permit them to be accepted for the fiture. The presence of Dr. Negrin at the head of the Government would be an indispensable condition; his undisputed authority in all section of opinion constitutes the best guarantee of obtaining a speedy pacification of Spain, for everyone would be ready to accept from him directions which would not perhaps be accepted from another. When we speak of the Republic, we mean the Republic of to-day; with its significance an %d its men, who are |