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      and Italy naval and aerial control of the passage from the north 
      to the south Atlantic. This would compel South Africa and possibly 
      parts of South America to make terms with the victorious totalitarian 
      powers. The occupation of Singapore by Japan would give her control 
      of the Indian Ocean and enable her to impose such terms as she 
      liked on Australia and New Oealand as the price of not interrupting 
      their trade communications with Europe on the one side and the 
      Americas on the other.
 
      The political and economic consequences of such a transformation 
      of the world on the United States are discussed in Section 3 
      of the Memorandum. The strategic consequences would be to compel 
      the United States in the interests of their own defence not only 
      to multiply armaments enormously, but to demand and if necessary 
      seize aerial and naval bases, at least in the Atlantic, a thousand 
      miles from her shores, just as to-day she has the Aleutian Islands 
      and Hawaii far out in the Pacific. In order to buy off her hostility 
      the victorious totalitarian powers would probably offer to transfer 
      to the United States the British West Indian Islands and possibly 
      French and British Guiana. On the other hand they might demand 
      the use of a naval and aerial base in Ireland, which in the last 
      resort Ireland would be impotent to refuse. Portugal and Spain 
      would almost certainly come within their orbit, so that they 
      would obtain control of the Azores, Madeira and Teneriffe. What 
      the political effect of this totalitarian triumph on South America 
      would be it is difficult to estimate, but it would certainly 
      make the military defence of the Monroe Doctrine by the United 
      States a tremendously formidable undertaking.
 
      
 
 
11.
 
      The second alternative is that the traditional method of "squeeze" 
      through power politics, that is to say the placing of your opponent 
      in such a position that at the particular point it is impossible 
      for him to resist the "gangster" technique which was 
      appl %ied both in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia will be 
      progressively applied both to