July 14, 1941.
 
 
           1. I would leave out all reference in written instructions 
to British convoys and substitute a simple paragraph providing for 
constant Information to the British and Canadian convoy authorities 
telling them exactly where American, icelandic or neutral flagships 
are on the communications line between the United States or 
Newfoundland and Iceland in either direction. They should also 
be simultaneously informed as to what the American Navy escort is 
of such ships.
 
           2. In place of paragraphs 3, 4,5, and 6, I suggest some-
thing like the following::
 
 
                    "The President, in his message to the Congress, 
                notified the Congress that:
 
                    (a) communications between the United States 
          and U.S. Naval bases on the one side, and 
          Iceland on the other, would be kept open and
 
                    (b) that such communications by water would 
          be protected against attack or throat of attack.  
          It is obviously  impossible to define "threat of 
          attack" by the presence of a German submarine 
          or surface raider a given number of miles away 
          from a conveyed vessel. It is necessary under 
          the conditions of modern sea warfare to recognize 
          that the words "threat of attack" may extend to 
          reasonably longer distances away from a convoy 
          ship or ships.
 
           It thus seems clear that the very presence of a German 
submarine or raider on or near the line of communications con-
stitutes threat of attack.
 
           Therefore, the presence of any German Subuarine or raider 
should be dealt with by action looking to the elimination of 
any threat of attack on the line of communications or close to
it