operations in the China Sea. It can not be held in the absence
 
of fairly continuous Fleet support. No matter what gains are 
 
made in the Mid-Pacific, they would undoubtedly be lost were
 
the Fleet to be withdrawn to the Atlantic. We would have then
 
to choose between a lengthy evacuation process, and a major
 
loss of men, material and prestige.
 
              In advancing to the capture of Penape and Truk, the
 
Orange Plan contemplates proceeding promptly, delaying in the
 
Marshalls only long enough to destroy Japanese shore bases, 
 
to capture the atolls neccessary to support the advance, and
 
to deny future bases to Japan.
 
     We have little knowledge as to the present defensive
 
strength of the Marshall and Caroline groups, considered as a
 
whole. If they are well defended, to capture them we estimate
 
initial needs at 25,000 thoroughly trained troops, with another 
 
50,000 in immediate reserve. If they are not well defended, an
 
early advance with fewer troops might be very profitable.
 
Several months must elapse from the present date before 75, 000
 
troops could be made ready, considering the defense require-
 
ments of Alaska, Hawaii, and Samoa, and our commitments with
 
respect to the internal political stability of the Latin-
 
American countries.
 
     We should consider carefully the chances of failure
 
as well as of success. An immediate success would be most
 
important morally, while a failure would be costly from the
 
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