The odds seem against our being able under Plan (D)
 
to check Japanese expansion unless we win the war in Europe. 
 
We might not long retain possession of the Philippines. Our 
 
political and military influence in the Far East might largely 
 
disappear, so long as we were fully engaged in the Atlantic. 
 
A preliminary to a war in this category would be a positive 
 
effort to avoid war with Japan, and to endeavor to prevent war 
 
between Japan and the British Empire and the Netherlands East 
 
Indies. The possible cost of avoiding a war with Japan has 
 
been referred to previously.
 
               I would add that Plan (D) does not mean the immediate 
 
movement of the Fleet into the Atlantic. I would make no further 
 
moves until war should become imminent, and then I would recom-
 
mend redistribution of our naval forces as the situation then 
 
demanded. I fully recognize the value of retaining strong 
 
forces in the Pacific as long as they can profitably be kept 
 
there.
 
              Until such time as the United States should decide to
 
engage its full forces in war, I recommend that we pursue a 
 
course that will most rapidly increase the military strength of
 
both the Army and the Navy, that is to say, adopt Alternative 
 
(A) without hostilities.
 
              Under any decision that the President may tentatively 
 
make, we should at once prepare a complete Joint Plan for 
 
guiding Army and Navy activities. We should also prepare at 
 
least the skeletons of alternative plans to fit possible alter-
 
native situation which may eventuate. I make the specific
 
 
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