Africa - Military Considerations
 
     The United States cannot tolerate a German lodgment in the Atlantic
 
Islands or on the West Coast of Africa.
 
     It is the offensive which wins in war. A direct occupation of Dakar 
 
and the Islands alone would be defensive. It would abandon the Strait
 
of Gibraltar and French North Africa to the Germans and allow the British 
 
to be driven from their only naval base in the Western Mediterranean. It 
 
would miss the opportunity of cooperating with the British advance in
 
Libya.
 
     The same amount of force, or perhaps somewhat more, used in Morocco 
 
would be an offensive operation. It would stop the Germans at the shore 
 
line. It would exclude them from that part of the African Continent alto-
 
gether. It would assure the safety of  West Africa and gain much more. 
 
Coupled with the British advance in Libya, it might place the Allies in 
 
possession of the whole north shore of the African Continent--which is 
 
a strategic necessity for the blockade of Germany and the winning of the
 
war.
 
     If this can be accomplished now with a minimum expenditure of force, 
 
it will be far better than to do it later on at maximum cost. It must be 
 
done sometime.
 
     The military steps suggested for consideration are: 1. Occupation 
 
of the Madeira Islands as an advance base; 2. Occupation of Tangier by 
 
well-equipped highly mobile force to contain the troops in Spanish Mor-
 
occo and command communications between Spanish and French Morocco, cover-
 
ing the main landing at Casablanca; 3. Disembarkation of the main body 
 
of troops at Casablanca.
 
     We have already accepted the principle that the defense of South 
 
America depends on the West African Coast. Actually it begins at the
 
Strait of Gibraltar. The way to keep the Germans out of Africa is to 
 
keep them out of Africa, not prepare to fight them after they have gotten
 
there.
 
 
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