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harvest, if they can reap their crops unmolested by the enemy, they will almost surely pass the
 
actual survival period. Any thing that any country might want to do in material help for
 
them after that time will be in the nature of raising their
 
standard of living either medically or in other ways.
 
     It seems to me hard to set down any estimates along these
 
lines that are worth anything at all, since the amounts will
 
depend on whether you want the average Jugoslav to be able to
 
live in American terms at a 200, 600, 1,000 or what-not dollar
 
level a year. It is also hard to estimate their needs in terms of a profitable investment for the
 
country supplying them, since it is hard to say whether their mines and timber or other
 
economic assets will be equally rapidly developed after the
 
war, and there are various other uncertainties as to which of
 
them would be an attractive investment. There is, in the case
 
of the United States, the further question of whether we as a
 
government have any interest in any investment or economic trade
 
concessions in Jugoslavia or whether we prefer to leave it to the
 
initiative and individual option of private capital. To summarize, the post-war efforts necessary
 
to keep the Jugoslavs from dying of famine or epidemic are probably small both in personnel and
 
material. The efforts necessary to put them on the economic map, and give them what we call a 
 
decent standard of living, are undoubtedly considerably greater and very hard to estimate. The 
 
desirability of doing the latter depends as such on poitical  as