Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors. The party of the second part is
either a shrewd trader to be admired or a sucker to be despised.
 
             We have obtained some concessions after exerting all the pressure we could assemble.
These included the Frantic bases, improved communications, exchange of weather, trucks to
China, exchange of enemy intelligence, some promises regarding the Far East, and some other
inconsequential ones. The cost to the Soviet Union for any of these projects has been nil
compared to the cost of our efforts in their behalf. Some will say that the Red Army has won the
war for us. I can swallow all of this but the last two words. In our dealings with the Soviet
authorities, the U.S. Military Mission has made every approach that has been made. Our files are
bulging with letters to the Soviets and devoid of letters from them. This situation may be reversed
in Washington, but I doubt it. In short, we are in the position of being at the same time the givers
and the supplicants. This is neither dignified nor healthy for U. S. prestige.
 
           The picture is not all bad. The individual Russian is a likeable person. Their racial
characteristics are similar to ours. Individually I think they would be friendly if they dared to be --
however, I have yet to see the inside of a Russian home. Officials dare not become too friendly
with us, and others are persecuted for this offense. The Soviets have done an amazing job for their
own people -- both in the war and in the pre-war period. One cannot help admire their war effort
and the spirit with which it has been accomplished. We have few conflicting interests, and there is
little reason why we should not be friendly now and in the foreseeable future.
 
          In closing, I believe we should revise our present attitude along the following lines.
 
          (1) Continue to assist the Soviet Union, provided they request such assistance, and we are
satisfied that it contributes to winning the war.
 
          (2) Insist that they justify their needs for assistance in all cases where the need is not
apparent to us. If they fail to do so, we should, in such cases, refuse assistance.
 
          (3) In all cases where our assistance does not contribute to the winning of the war, we
should insist on a quid pro quo.
 
     (4) We should present proposals for collaboration that would be mutually beneficial, and
then leave the next move to them.