PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
 
                             Summary
 
1.  President's formula calls for unanimity in most cases.
 
        Unanimity of the permanent members of the Security 
Council, under the voting formula proposed by the 
President on December 5, 1944, would prevail in six
categories of decisions having political and enforcement 
character. It would also prevail in the remaining 
category of decisions involving promotion of peaceful 
settlement of disputes, except when one of the permanent 
members is a party to a dispute.
 
2 Soviet proposal would increase domestic United States
   opposition.
 
        The proposed formula, or its basic principle, seems 
more clearly essential to us.now than heretofore. Our 
talks with members of Congress, and groups and individuals 
throughout the country, indicate that its abandonment 
would gravely alienate many sincere supporters of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and would provide perfectionists 
and isolationlets with a powerful weapon against American 
participation in the Organization. It is furthermore 
disturbing that acceptance by us of the straight unanimity 
rule would be interpreted as surrender to Russia, whose 
rigid advocacy of that rule is widely known.
 
3.  Soviet proposal is opposed by small nations.
 
        At the same time, our discussions with representa-
tives of other American republics and United Nations 
have disclosed the strongest official opposition to the 
straight unanimity rule. It may be difficult, if not 
impossible, for their governments to secure popular sup-
port for entrance into an international organization 
which, with such a rule, would bear every earmark of a
great-power alliance. It appears that all of them would 
be bitterly disillusioned, that some may stay out, and 
that under such a rule various smaller nations after 
joining the organization may feel obliged to align them-
selves with great powers, which would render the organi-
zation undependable and unstable.