January 16, 1945.
Reparation and Restitution Policy toward Germany
1. Nature of American Interest
It is dangerous to assume, because the reparation
claims of this country are likely to be very small, that
we have little interest in the subject of reparation.
Not only can an ill-conceived reparation policy give
rise to mischievous consequences in itself but, what is
even more important, it may jeopardize the achievement of
the political and economic objectives of this country
vis-a-vis Germany. For these reasons the raparation
settlement with Germany is an issue of major importance
to the United States.
Accordingly, the guiding principle of U. S. policy
in regard to reparation should be that the reparation
claims of our Allies should be supported only if, and to
the extent that, such claims do not conflict with the
other elements of the settlement with Germany. Reparation
policies must conform and be subordinate to the security
and economic measures adopted with respect to Germany;
these measures should not be modified or weakened to enable
Germany to pay more reparation.
Conceived thus as a "residual", the reparation pro-
gram will be determined, in its main outlines, by prior
decisions with regard to industrial controls, export
restrictions, territorial adjustments, etc. which may
be imposed on Germany. For example, if chief reliance
for economic security is placed on selective prohibitions
and controls, Germany may be able (barring extreme war
damage) to deliver a large volume of reparation goods
out of current production. If, on the other hand, large
sections of German industry are to be permanently dis-
mantled, the bulk of reparation payments would necessarily
take the form of transfers of existing German capital
equipment, rather than of current output, and the total
volume of reparation deliveries is likely to be com-
paratively small. Similarly, restriction of exports
for commercial reasons, or important transfers of terri-
tory, would likewise affect the amount and form of
reparation.
The