2
 
no longer be power to balance.
 
       Far from holding the key as being the determining 
influence in the picture, therefore, Britain perforce 
assumes a secondary role, and must look to her security 
in other ways. She hopes to find it first in a strong 
and effective international organization backed by force. 
As the weakest of the three major powers, and as one 
occupying an exposed position, she could not logically 
adopt any other course, even if she did not already 
possess the sincere desire to create an organization
capable of maintaining peace. However, to her the effec-
tiveness of post-war cooperation between the great powers 
and of an international body such as is envisaged in the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals remains to be seen, and it is 
not a characteristic of European politics to place sole
reliance on untriedmethods and means. Furthermore, 
Britain entertains grave doubts as to the intentions of 
the Russians in the whole scheme of things and questions 
the sincerity of their expression of willingness to 
settle European problems through agreement between the 
parties concerned. The British are afraid that the 
Russians may play a lone hand -- which they will be in a
position to do if they so desire. Britain would prefer 
to cooperate, but realizes she may have to compete.
 
       In view of the circumstances it is not to be un-
expected that the British will "hedge" against a possible 
unsuccessful outcome of international collaboration, and 
will attempt at the same time to strengthen their position 
by the o1d power politics system. We eau hardly blame 
them for seeking any additional means of making themselves 
secure -- they who through bitter personal experience know 
the grim realities of war and the ever-present danger of 
it--and, as previously indicated, they are already work-
ing to this end.
 
     Since there will no longer be power to balance in 
Europe, Britain would logically turn to the United States 
as the greatest potential source of support in developing 
an adequate counterpoise to Russia. Without the assured 
support of the United States, any combination of powers 
which Britain might be able to assemble would still leave 
Russia preponderantly strong. The British know that we 
 
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