Communism, both of which opposed the Church. Then the call of Italian
patriotism was strong, and until Mussolini's policy proved such a
dismal   
failure, there was little inclination to disturb the compromise between
Church and State. Fear only began to grow when the Fascist Party began
to   
steal youth from the Church. Now things have drifted to such a pass
that   
if the Vatican does not take up a more strongly anti-Fascist and
anti-Nazi   
attitude, it may lose the sympathy of many Catholics in Britain and
America.  
 If it does make a stronger stand, it may be driven from Europe. Of
course,  
would make the whole position much easier if Italy left the 
 
                                                            
 
 
There are several schools of thought all urging their   
opinions. First, there are the purely religious, prelates, and clergy,
who   
believe that no sort of compromise with the revolutionaries is now
possible. They say that if the dictators are prepared to tolerate the
Church on certain terms, it is only because, for a passing moment, they
want to use it for their own purposes, and that later they will turn
with all the strength thus gained in an attempt utterly to destroy it.
In the meantime, the sympathy of British and American Catholics might
be lost. Others argue that the Papacy must always keep itself show that
there are at least some influential prelates working in the diplomatic
field, aloof from the secular quarrels of the great Powers, and that
the revolutionary forces win bum themselves out, while the Church will
endure. They think that to count this upheaval as different from all
others before it, is too extreme and dramatic, and that if only
everybody would keep calm, the Vatican could retain its hold over its
European, British, and American flocks, while the storm blows itself
out. But some of those who hold this view are not keeping aloof from
secular politics. There is much evidence to and that   
theyxlayout a policy of all round compromise, utterly repugnant to the
                          Allies.                           
 
                                                            
 
 
The Pope, himself, like his predecessor, knows quite well   
that if Naziism survives, its opposition to the Church will become more
 relentless as time goes on. All the evidence goes to show this.   
Occasionally, the German government may make some small concession for
purposes of propaganda, or convenience, but the wide sweep of its
policy   
is directed against the Christian Faith and against the Catholic
Church.   
The nation's youth is being educated in an anti-Christian religion. The
Pope is thus confronted with a great dilemma. His own opinion about it
is   
firm enough, but, as with Mr. Roosevelt, his people are not absolutely
       united, and his hands are not completely free.       
 
                                                            
 
 
Such is the main problem facing the Vatican. Should it,   
and can it, take a wholehearted stand about the war and revolutionary
challenge, c~r should it and must it keep wholly aloof from the
business,   
intervening only occasionally in matters like the treatment Of
prisoners,   
sometimes pronouncing on the higher issue of international morality? In
many past wars, this has been the broad line of Papal policy, but would
it   
now satisfy the more religious elements in Europe and in Britain and   
America? Those who see in this war the challenge of anti-Christ   
(or his forerunner), do not think that the Church should be neutral, or
can hold aloof. Until now the issue has not become sufficiently acute
to  
 force a positive decision, and whatever the activities of more worldly
forces, the Pope himself has not yet offended or disappointed those who
favour the bolder course, but we are probably approaching a time when
the   
Papacy, like America, must positively decide upon an active policy of
opposition to the Axis Powers, or drift  into a neutrality which will,
in   
                    fact, help the Axis.                    
 
                                                            
 
 
The Pope's secondary problems are also pressing. First,   
there is the claim ihe Church has strongly opposed itself to atheistic
Communism and to the Soviet government. It is true that during recent  
 years there has been a small minority which has favoured some  
 modification, but this opinion did not prevail, and its very existence
was hotly denied. Now that Russia is in alliance with the very Allies
who  
 are opposing the pagan Axis forces, the Vatican finds itself in an   
extremely difficult position. So difficult, indeed, that to pursue a   
definite pro-Allied policy is harder now than it was before June 22nd.
This may tend to strengthen the influence of those who would like to
see   
the Pope remaining severely aloof from the war. The Vatican is well
aware   
that many of its chief supporters in Europe, including those who have
risked most in opposing the encroachment of Fascism and Naziism, are   
strongly anti-Communist. This is indeed true of nearly all the
anti-Nazi   
Catholic elements throughout the Continent. Unfortunately, those who do
take a more liberal view over Communism, also tend to feel the same
about   
the Nazis. The Russian i.~ue has, therefore, caused some confusion
which   
  on the whole operates to Germany's political advantage.   
 
                                                            
 
 
The Pope is then confronted with the problem of France.   
Here he is supporting a gove,'nment of which Britain and America
strongly   
disapprove. But lhings are even more complicated than this, for while
he   
has sympathy with Marshal Petain and General Weygand, he has very
little   
with some others in Vichy. His attitude towards the French politicians
in   
Paris is hostile. It is certain that the Vatican is doing what it can
to   
uphold  
10