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(3) political conditions in Ireland. This means refraining from a course   
which would consolidate the Irish Opposition behind the Government and   
force our actual and potential friends to support the Prime Minister  
(1) As regards military considerations, it seems probable, if not   
inevitable, that if and when the attack on Britain is made, Ireland will   
also be invaded. Mr. de Valera subscribes to this point, of view and   
presses, both the British and American Governments for armament on all   
occasions... He will, however, give no undertaking that he will not use   
these arms in the event that forceful seizure of ports and air bases were   
attempted. The question to be decided from the military poinnt of view is   
whether the Battle of the Atlantic can be won without such ports and bases.   
If it becomes possible by longer range fighting planes to use bases now   
being developed in Northern Ireland and to dispense with ports and bases   
in Southern Ireland, the question would be much simplified for, in that   
case, Britain could give Mr de Valera an unqualified undertaking that   
under no circumstances would they invade him. The effect of this would   
probably be to foster pro-British sentiment and a freer attitude on the   
   part of the Irish chiefs, which is not unfriendly now.   
 
                                                            
 
 
 Without any official basis for my statements, I have pointed out to Mr.   
de Valera that it appeared to me that the British Government, being   
convinced that they were to receive no assistance for the Battle of the   
Atlantic from the Irish Government, had with the cooperation of the United   
States under the Lend-Lease Act, determined to make an invincible   
fortress out of the six counties with an adequate garrison, and in effect   
to leave Southern Ireland to depend entirely on its own re-