copy the responsibility for the decision whether to arm or not to arm the Irish army. The policy aclvocated by the British representative in Ireland, Sir John Maffey, and which I unqualifiedly endorse, is to conciliate the Irish army and to obtain its good will by procuring from time to time equipment, which it greatly needs but of a nature which in the vent of an Anglo-Irish crisis would not seriously threaten Britain. The effect of this attitude on the part of the British reprosentative, and the effect of my attitude in refusing to recommend arms without an explicit undertaking as to their use, have tended to drive the Irish Government into a more friendly attitude to the British and to encourage resentment-against the American Government and myself, as its representative. I am convinced that Mr. de Valera entertains a very bitter personal resentment against the President, who has refused to be ~which in intimidated by the Irish in American pressure groups, which in the past have been so powerful in American politics. Mr. de Valera made a serious tactical error in sending a member of his Cabinet, Frank Aiken, to the United States with authority to utilize the efforts of the Irish Nationalist Parties and to identify himself with them as he did by making speeches to the friends of Irish neutrality. This has given me a just grievance which I have pressed home in every way short of a formal protest and which will, I believe, have more effect as time goes on and Mr. Aiken's report as to the unwillingmess of the American people to support the President's defense policy becomos apparent. It is inevitable that Mr. de Valera, should at last come to realize that he has backed the wrong horse, and that I very explicitly amd in writing warned Mr. Aiken against just the mistake that he has made before he left for America. |