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the responsibility for the decision whether to arm or not to arm the
Irish army. The policy aclvocated by the British representative in
Ireland, Sir John Maffey, and which I unqualifiedly endorse, is to
conciliate the Irish army and to obtain its good will by procuring from
time to time equipment, which it greatly needs but of a nature which in
the vent of an Anglo-Irish crisis would not seriously threaten Britain.
The effect of this attitude on the part of the British reprosentative,
and the effect of my attitude in refusing to recommend arms without an
explicit undertaking as to their use, have tended to drive the Irish
Government into a more friendly attitude to the British and to encourage
resentment-against the American Government and myself, as its
representative. I am convinced that Mr. de Valera entertains a very
bitter personal resentment against the President, who has refused to be
~which in
intimidated by the Irish in American pressure groups, which in the past
have been so powerful in American politics. Mr. de Valera made a serious
tactical error in sending a member of his Cabinet, Frank Aiken, to the
United States with authority to utilize the efforts of the Irish
Nationalist Parties and to identify himself with them as he did by making
speeches to the friends of Irish neutrality. This has given me a just
grievance which I have pressed home in every way short of a formal
protest and which will, I believe, have more effect as time goes on
and Mr. Aiken's report as to the unwillingmess of the American people
to support the President's defense policy becomos apparent. It is
inevitable that Mr. de Valera, should at last come to realize that he has
backed the wrong horse, and that I very explicitly amd in writing
warned Mr. Aiken against just the mistake that he has made before he
left for America.