either country. In both countries there is a tendency to eschew clear-cut  
solutions and to rely on time and opportunity to remedy obvious defects in an  
imperfect scheme of things.  In both countries statesmen are apt to wish to  
keep a way of retreat in case there has been a miscalculation of forces.We may  
expect, therefore, that proposals for collaboration will tend to be tentative  
and limited to the emergency of the moment rather than far-reaching and  
irrevocable. There will need to be a habit of collaboration formed before  
public opinion in either country will welcome complete fusion of defense forces  
or permanent economic organizations. It may be that if the organs set up for  
this purpose are described as temporary they will work better than if tradition  
         is too strongly challenged at the outset.          
 
                                                            
 
 
8. The main force drawing the two countries together is that of common  
security. Public opinion in both countries will undoubtedly demand some scheme  
to ensure that a third World War shall not break out. They should, therefore,  
be prepared to accept close and intimate collaboration such as has already  
been begun. This already includes the provision of bases and the sharing of  
existing baxes and dockyards, the standardization of material and common  
training of personnel. If such aids are made permanent after the war, and  
common defense boards made for the whole Commonwealth as already exists for  
Canada, the relation will be almost as close as between the Bavarian and  
Prussian armies before 1914. The institution of a Joint Defense Board for the  
entire system of Anglo-American security would coordinate the whole while  
leaving the separate armies, navies and air forces intact. The fact that the  
Dominions have separate armies, fleets and air forces shows that anything more  
              than this cannot be anticipated.              
 
                                                            
 
 
9.  The extent to which the two countries will take a common responsibility  
for the security of the rest of the world cannot yet be estimated. It is  
suggested, however, that an examination of Anglo-Saxon security will show that  
it cannot be obtained without also guaranteeing that of the greater part of  
Europe from aggression. Latin America is also necessarily guaranteed by the  
United States against aggression from other continents. Since Africa is really  
dependent on European and oceanic security, this only leaves a large Asiatic  
bloc and the U.S.S.R. outside the area of guarantee. The attitude of the two  
Powers towards this area will depend on the position of (a) the U.S.S.R.; (b)  
ow far the China Incident is liquidated by the end of the wa
 
                                                            
 
 
10. The crux of the whole question of joint defense is the attitude of  
Britain and the United States towards European security. It is not likely that  
Britain would take responsibilities there if the United States disapproved.  
On the