Text Version

                       June 14, 1944.                       
  Upon arrival in Rome it immediately   
developed from very early consultation with the leaders of the Liberation   
and resistance fronts that there were two possible courses of action open   
               to the Allied representatives:               
  l) To require as representatives of the   
occupying forces that Badoglio continue as Prime Minister and that Roman   
                leaders enter his Ministry;                 
  2) To bring together the members of the   
Italian Government and  the national leaders of the Parties of Liberation,   
who were assembled in Rome, and to insist that they form the most   
representative Government possible which would at the same time agree to   
leave open the institutional question until after the war and accept the   
obligations Badoglio had assumed towards the Allies both under the   
         Armistice and under subsequent agreements.         
If the first course had been selected it would have meant driving  
a considerable majority of anti-Fascist elements, north of Naples, into   
opposition and the creation of a weak Government heavily overbalanced to   
the Right. Regardless of all that Badoglio had done to keep Italy going   
and of the spontaneity of his reception by the Romans, it was clear that   
the people of German-occupied Italy had not forgotten he had left them on   
Sept, 8 without directives to govern their conduct when the Germans   
descended upon them. There was also the very strong conviction on the part   
of many of the leaders with whom we talked that no resurgence of Italy was  
 possible unless a clean break was made with their Fascist past. Badoglio   
did not represent this factor and any Government forced under his   
            leadership would have been weak both            
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