(COPY)
Below are copies of three parts to a cablegram from the M.A., Cairo 
Part 1 was filed June 14 and received at 15:12, June 15 in W. D. 
Part 2 was filed June 15 and received at 08:57, June 18 in W. D. 
Part 3 was filed June 16 and received at 06:55, June 17
 
                    Part I
 
     1. The responsibility for the losses which the Navy sustained
 
in the evacuation from Crete should be charged to the Army, according
 
to Naval officers, for in the effort to save Army personnel the Navy 
 
exposed its ships to the most concentrated air bombardment which has
 
ever been employed against naval units. The situation at Crete was sheer
 
folly, a massacre of one branch of the service in order to preserve the
 
other from being massacred.
 
     2. The Army, on the other hand, contends that if the air 
 
force had granted any pursuit squadrons, the withdrawal would not have
 
been necessary. What they lose sight of is the fact that after the
 
casualties of the Greek campaign, the air force did not have enough
 
planes to grant pursuit protection. Whoever expected it in Crete was
 
ignorant of the facts, and yet it seems that all concerned expected it. 
 
     3. It is  not possible to hold General Freiberg or his
 
brave soldiers responsible. Denied protection from the air, they
 
surrendered Crete deluged by the most concentrated air bombardment yet
 
beheld. The island was secure from the sea. The naval protection
 
afforded by the fleet kept the island's sea flanks and all ranks attained
 
a stature beyond the call of duty during the withdrawal. It must be obvious
 
that the air force which had never made any promise of substantial aid but
 
which granted much more than deemed possible must be held innocent of any
 
blame for the fiasco.
 
     4. The air, land, and sea defeats of the Middle East Command
 
since the month of March once again highlight divided responsibility which
 
is part of its command system.
 
                              - 1-