5. After the withdrawal from Greece, the three commanders- in-chief voted not to attempt to hold Crete. Orders arrived from London that the island was to be held. 6. A conference was held on May 13 of the Army, Navy and Air comanders. It was the sentiment of all that the fleet would maintain the security of the sea flanks without fail and that "the present strength of the R.A.F., six Hurricanes, was to be added to by ten Blenheim pursuit planes if procurable." 7. The air force made no promise in regard to material assistance. However, as the German air operations grew, planes were tragically necessary and both at sea and ashore there were wild demands for fighter protection. No such planes were available for service. Nevertheless, the lack of them was availed of to alibi the Cretan disaster. FELLERS PART II 1. Admiral Cunningham, commanding the Mediterranean Fleet has no very high opinion of the operation of the air force during the battle for Crete. Now that it is over, he estimates at its proper weight the importance of air strength, and has ordered to England by plane Lord Louis Mountbatten, the King' s cousin and the former commander of the sunken KELLEY (destroyer), with the mission of gaining a personal audience with King George to inform him that if 1,000 planes are not immediately received, the Middle East cannot be held. General Wavell recently wired the Prime Minister that the War Cabinet must contain at least one man who is conscious of the fact that the British have other lines to hold than those which center in London. 2. After the evacuation from Crete, there arose a serious -2- |