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          But he emphasized that he did not believe at the time of Munich, and he did not believe 
 
now, that this one factor--the unity of the German peoples of Central Europe--was what the 
 
German people really desired, much less what their present leaders desired.  He repeated to me 
 
how Hitler had said personally to him at Munich that the Czechs were an inferior people, and that 
 
Germany would never consent to defile the purity of the German race by incorporating Bohemia 
 
and Moravia in Greater Germany, and now of course Hitler had proved that the assurances given 
 
in that sense had been lies, knowingly uttered. He believed that the German Government had been
 
following very intelligently a policy of ultimate domination of Europe and of the Near East. He 
 
was by no means sure that the ultimate ambitions did not go further.  In any event, he said, the 
 
point had been reached where France could no longer submit to the kind of experience to which 
 
the present German regime was forcing Europe to submit, and France consequently must fight 
 
until she had gained actual security for herself.
 
          He knew thoroughly well that the assurances continually uttered by Hitler, that he had 
 
forever renounced any aspirations upon Alsace-Lorraine, were as untruthful as the assurances he 
 
had earlier given with regard to Czechoslovakia, since he had absolute evidence that German 
 
propaganda agents long before the outbreak of war had been attempting to create the same kind 
 
of emotional stir among the German-speaking peoples in Alsace as that which had been created by 
 
German agents in 1938 in the Sudetenland. He said that he even had documents showing that