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strategic place. I had gained the impression that the Italian Government believed that if a "real 
 
war" broke out its own position would become increagingly precarious with every week that 
 
passed. Its economic situation would become prejudiced because of the greatly increased
 
difficulties under such conditions of obtaining the raw materials, such as coal, which were 
 
indispensable to its national economy. The military pressure w.hlch would undoubtedly be 
 
brought to bear upon Italy from one side or the other, or from both, would result in serious 
 
disquiet on the part of the Italian people, and it was therefore my Judgment that Italy desired to 
 
do what she could to further peace, although of course always taking it for granted that in the 
 
negotiation of any agreement which might result in peace Italy would be out to get for herself 
 
everything that could be obtained.
 
          M. Daladier then went on to a discussion of French peace objectives. He said that 
 
obviously neither France nor England could agree, from the political standpoint, to any peace 
 
which dld not provide for the restoration of an independent Poland and for the independence of 
 
the Czech people. He said that in his own Judgment there was every reason why the really 
 
German peoples of Central Europe should live under German rule, provided they so desired.  The 
 
City of Danzig was clearly a German city, and it was equally obvious that the Germans of the
 
Sudetenland or of Western Poland should be afforded the opportunity of uniting with the Reich if 
 
they so desired.  That, he said, had been his point of view at the time of the Munich Agreement.
 
But