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undoubtedly remembered from a conversation  had had
 
with him at that time, he had believed that France should
 
declare war upon Germany in order to save Czechoslovakia,
 
and that he was convinced that if France had done so at
 
that time, England would have been forced into the war on
 
the side of France. Munich had been a cardinal error in
 
French and British policy.
 
       But that was past history. His well-known sentiments 
 
on this subject, and on the general subject of Franco-
 
German relations, made it easier for him to follow an ob-
 
jective policy now.
 
     He stated to me quite plainly that he believed the
 
political and territorial issues now at stake could be
 
solved without any considerable difficulty through nego-
 
tiations between the Allies and Germany. He stated that
 
the real problem was the problem of how France could
 
obtain security and insure herself against a repetition
 
of German aggression. He said that if a practical scheme
 
could be devised, upon the basis of an international air 
 
force as a police power, and the abolition of all cate-
 
gories of offensive armament, he would support such a
 
negotiation, believing it to be infinitely more in the
 
interests of the French people than the continuation of
 
the present war, with the probable economic and social
 
havoc and ruin which would result, quite apart from the
 
inevitable losses in life and property.
 
       M. Paut Reynaud spoke with deep appreciation of the 
 
cooperation shown the French Treasury by the American 
 
Treasury Department. He especially asked-- that I convey
 
his gratitude to Secretary Morgenthau.
 
                                                                    As