possible that Mussolini would agree. He said that Italy
 
had everything to lose by such an arrangement and nothing
 
to gain. He said that Italy's vital interest lay in keep-
 
ing the Balkans and the Near East free from Russian expan-
 
sion, and that he could not imagine that Italy would agree
 
to any tripartite arrangement which would result in German 
 
and Russian domination of portions of the Balkan countries.
 
     He stated with great emphasis that Germany had lost
 
out on every front in her diplomatic dealings with Russia.
 
He said that in the North the peace imposed by Russia upon
 
Finland, and the Russian domination of the Baltic states
 
previously agreed to by Germany, had turned the Baltic
 
into a Russian lake rather than a German lake, and that
 
as a result Russia had offset every German gain which Hitler
 
had obtained in Northern Europe since 1933. In so far as
 
Central and Southeastern Europe were concerned, the Cardinal
 
believed that Germany's apparent gains were in reality il-
 
lusory. He felt convinced that in those regions Russia
 
had been the real gainer and that sooner or later Germany
 
would find the preponderant position which she had ceded
 
to Russia of grave detriment to her own vital interests.
 
     The Cardinal spoke with much affection of the French
 
people and of M. Daladier. He spoke with ill-concealed
 
aversion for the German Government and with great appre-
 
hension of the increase of Russian influence in Central
 
Europe. He told me that he believed that Communism was
 
rapidly increasing in Germany, and that. if the war con-
 
tinued for any appreciable length of time, Communism
 
would be a dominating factor within Germany itself.
 
       The Cardinal impressed me as an extremely intelligent 
 
man with a very keen insight into present European affairs.
 
                                   I