able to the United Statas in 1942. The detailed data used
in these estimates and comparisons are attached hereto in:
 
Annex A - Forces required to secure the Southwest
 
                 Pacific.
 
Annex B- Forces required to secure the Eastern Paci‚ic.
 
Annex C - Forces required for offensive action in the
 
European Theater.
 
Annex D - Additional overseas requirements if an offensive
           is undertaken in Europe.
 
Annex E - Availability and Deploymcnt of naval forces
                to meet assumed requirements.
 
Annex F- Availability of ground and air forces.
 
Annex G - Availability of U.S. Shipping.
 
Annex H - Summary.
 
4.    Overseas movements in 1942 are so limited by a general shortage of cargo shipping that it is
ncccssary to analyze the courses of action under consideration in terms of the shipping problems
involved, and thereby to determine their influence on the scale on which operations involving over
seas troop movements can be carried on concurrently in various theaters. There are at present
available a sufficient number of transports to move all the troops which can be maintained by the
cargo shipping expected to be available. The analysis made is based on the assumption that the
number of cargo ships available under Army control for maintenance of United States ground and
air forces in overseas positions will bc augmentod by an avorage of 18 ships a month. If
the number is not so augmented the scope of contemplated operations must be reduced
corrospondingly. The analysis  is also based on the assumption that cargo vessels now under Navy
control or scheduled for Navy use will be able to main-
 
                              -2-