tain U.S. Naval combatant ships and ship based aircraft over-
seas.
 
5.    Although there are prospectively available more major
 
ground units than can be moved, the same is not true of air
 
forces. Accordingly, the availability of air forces both for
 
defense of the United States and its coastal communications,
 
and for offensive and defensive operations overseas similarly
 
requires careful evaluation.
 
6.    The general situation with respect to ground forces, shore
 
based air forces, and the shipping required to transport and
 
maintain them is briefly as follows:
 
     (a) To secure the Southwest Pacific Area, including
 
     Australia, requires on shore in overseas positions during
 
     1942 a total of 416,000 troops. Of this number 205,000
 
     are now in or en route to the areas concerned, leaving 191,000 to be transported. (See
     
     Annex A)
 
     (b) To secure the Eastern Pacific (Alaska, Hawaii, Pan-
 
     ama) requires on shore in overseas positions during 1942
 
     a total of 319,000 troops. Of this member !S1,000 are
 
     now  in or enroute to the areas concerned, leaving 180,000
 
     to be transported. (See Annex B)
 
     (c) The forecs required during 1942 for offensive action
 
     in the European Theater which will result in material
 
     diversion of German forces from the Russian front are
 
     estimated to amount to an army of about 600,000 ground
 
     troops, composed mostly of armored and mechanized div-
 
     isions organized in-such manner as to permit rapid and destructive blows at enemy 
 
     objectives.  These ground elements should be supported by an air force of about 6,500
     
     planes. (See Annex C )
 
     (d) Other deployments in overseas positions necessary if an
 
     offensive in Europe is undertaken  require during 1942 a total
 
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