jeopardize the negotiations and the operation; some Brazilians would undoubtedly inform the
Portuguese. In view of these considerations, it appears that only UNITED STATES forces
should be employed in the seizure of the AZORES.
 
     c.   The Portuguese forces in the AZORES probably would offer only slight resistance,
and although PORTUGAL would make strong protests against our action, a break with all the
UNITED NATIONS or adherence to the AXIS, is considered unlikely.
 
     d.   The Spanish and AXIS reactions would probably be identical to those which
would occur as a result of a peaceful occupation. There would be less likelihood of AXIS
reprisals.
 
13. Concept of the Operation.
 
     a.   Simultaneous ship-to-shore landings under carrier-based air cover with naval gun
support to be effected on FAYAL and TERCEIRA ISLANDS with objectives as follows (See
Appendix "B"):
 
(1) on FAYAL:
 
            To seize the cable and radio facilities and secure the harbor at HORTA.
 
(2) on TERCEIRA.
 
     To seize, secure, and place in operation the airfield at LAGENS.
 
     b. Subsequent to the above, to eliminate resistance on and occupy SAN MIGUEL
ISLAND, to secure and place, in operation the airfield at RAB0 d.o PEIXE and the harbor at
PONTA DELGADA.
 
14.  Forces required.
 
        a. It is estimated that the following will be required for an occupation of the AZORES by
force:
 
Ground:   1 Division, Reinforced (amphibiously trained).
 
Air:      1 Carrier Group, 36 fighters, 56 dive bombers.
 
Nava:          2 BB, 1 CV, 2 CA or CL, 23 DD, 15 APA, 5 AKA.
 
 
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