S E C R E T To extend operations into the eastern Mediterranean is to project our effort away from the decisive theater of war to a region remote therefrom and having substantially no land com- munications leading thereto. Such operations would involve longer and more hazardous sea communications, and would impose a strain on available Allied means for objectives that will have little, if any, influence on the outcome of the war. Such operations, except possibly in the case of Crete, are likely to arouse the suspicions of and be resented by Russia as being a continuation of the historic British policy of their domination of the Straits vis-a-vis Russia. An Allied occupation of Italy would appear likely to prove more of a liability than an asset. Aside from the maintenance of forces of occupation we would be faced with inescapable demands for supplies, including coal, for the civil population. Of the various objectives mentioned, the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica would appear to be the least objectionable. The communications thereto will be shorter and less exposed, and the occupation of those islands would facilitate a subsequent operation into Southern France. In lieu of a further extension of operations in the Mediterranean we should propose to the British at the forth- coming conference the implementation of the plan for the com- bined air offensive against German war industry. An estimate should be made by the planners of the effect upon German war making capacity of successful accomplishment of the four phases of that plan. Based upon this estimate the earliest practicable target date for ROUNDUP should be established. We should press the British for the acceptance of this target date and the utilization of our means to accomplish the maximum practicable buildup in the United Kingdom prior to that date. - 14 - DECLASSIFIED By Authority of B.D. Scurto Date Dec 8 1976 |